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Abstract 
 This paper studies empirically the effect of ownership concentration on the risk and 
performance of commercial banks, controlling for shareholders protection laws, bank 
regulations, and other country and bank specific traits. The sample used comprises 795 banks 
of 47 countries, in the period from 1997 to 2007. Our main finding is the existence of a cubic 
relationship between ownership concentration and bank performance. Such evidence is 
supportive of theoretical hypotheses of effective monitoring at low levels of ownership 
concentration, expropriation or losses connected to managerial discretion at moderate 
ownership concentration, and high costs of expropriation at high levels of ownership 
concentration. We also find that ownership concentration is more important to increase the 
performance of banks with low concentrated ownership structures, when legal protection of 
shareholders is low, and that capital regulations stringency is effective in simultaneously 
reducing risk and improving performance of banks. Regarding bank risk, we find a U-shape 
relationship between ownership concentration and earnings volatility, supporting that 
shareholder’s incentive to take risk prevails when her equity stake is above a threshold. 
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1. Introduction 
The study of risk and performance of banks is of great relevance, since banks’ investment 
decisions are argued to influence economic growth and stability (Allen and Gale, 2000a; 
Levine, 2006). Too little bank risk taking may hinder economic growth, whereas too much 
bank risk threatens economic stability. Hence, it makes sense for governments and institutions 
to regulate banks with the purpose of shaping and influencing bank risk taking and 
performance and attain economic growth and stability. 
Remarkably, the existence of regulations constraining the action of banks may make the 
governance of these institutions different from non-financial firms’ corporate governance. 
However, the debate whether banks are different from non-financial firms is far from 
conclusive and goes back to Fama (1985)’s famous question whether “are banks different?”. 
On the one hand, some authors (Macey and O’Hara, 2003; John and Qian, 2003; Levine, 
2003) argue that banks are different because they are heavily regulated, highly levered and 
more opaque than non-financial firms. On the other hand, authors like Caprio et al (2007) find 
that “the same core corporate control mechanisms that influence the governance of non-
financial firms also influence bank operations.”. 
This paper tries to shed new light to this debate by analyzing the connection between 
banks’ ownership structure and risk as well as performance using a rich database of 795 banks 
from 47 different countries for the period from 1997 to 2007. This database allows the use of 
dynamic panel data estimation techniques to control for endogeneity problems that emerge 
naturally in the ownership-performance analysis (Coles et al., 2006, 2007). Specifically, we 
first search for empirical evidence of linear and/or non-linear effects of ownership 
concentration – measured through the main shareholder’s equity holdings - on risk and 
performance of banks. Second, we examine the influence of country-specific shareholders 
protection laws and bank regulations on risk and performance of banks.  
Concerning bank performance, we do find evidence of a cubic relationship between 
ownership concentration and bank performance (positive, negative and positive). Such 
evidence is supportive of theoretical hypotheses of monitoring effect at low ownership 
concentration, expropriation or loss of managerial discretion effects from moderate to high 
ownership concentration, and high costs (and absence) of expropriation at very high 
concentrated ownership. A similar cubic relationship between performance and insider 
ownership was found by Morck et al. (1988) for non-financial firms. 
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Concerning bank risk taking, we find evidence of a U-shaped relationship between 
earnings volatility and ownership concentration. For main shareholder’s equity stakes of 25% 
and above, bank risk taking increases with ownership concentration. This finding supports the 
argument that shareholder’s incentive to take risk prevails when her equity stake in the bank 
is above a threshold. Also, we found a positive linear effect of ownership concentration on 
risk for small banks. Unlike Laeven and Levine (2006), we did not find the same evidence for 
large banks. Still regarding bank risk taking, we find that ownership concentration increases 
the risk of banks located in countries where legal protection of shareholders is more 
developed.  
Regarding shareholders’ protection laws affecting bank performance, we find that they 
interact with ownership concentration to influence the performance of banks with dispersed 
ownership structure. For this sub-sample of banks, our evidence is that increasing ownership 
concentration is more important to increase bank performance when protection of 
shareholders is low. Such evidence is very similar to the one Caprio et al. (2007) find for 
large banks. Turning to bank regulations, we find that ownership concentration is more 
important to increase the performance of banks with dispersed ownership structures when 
either capital regulations are stricter or competition in the bank industry is stronger.  
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes the most relevant 
literature akin to the objectives of this work. Section 3 is methodological and describes the 
sample, variables and empirical models to be tested. The empirical results obtained are 
presented in Section 4. In the final section of the article, we lay out the main conclusions of 
this research and discuss the significance of our results. 
 
2. Theoretical context 
To examine banks’ risk taking behaviour, we first rely on the traditional risk shifting 
theoretical hypothesis, by which shareholders in a limited liability firm have incentives to 
increase risk (Galai and Masulis, 1976; Esty, 1998), as they can experience unlimited gains, 
but no losses. Therefore, if managers act in the interests of shareholders, in principle they 
should seek to maximize shareholders’ wealth, by choosing to undertake the riskier projects 
available. Of course, such risk shifting behaviour is detrimental to creditors’ interests, unless 
these are able to effectively monitor managers. In the case of banks, the study of risk shifting 
is of special relevance, as banks are in general higher levered when compared to non financial 
firms, which means banks’ shareholders may experience incentives to shift high levels of risk. 
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According to agency theory, risk taking behaviour is influenced by conflicts between 
managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Instead of maximizing 
shareholders’ wealth, managers can pursue their own interests, by enjoying private benefits of 
control or preserving specific acquired human capital (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Kane, 1985). 
In addition, managers bear the specific risk of the firms they manage, and for such they are 
expected to be more risk averse than shareholders with a diversified investment portfolio. 
Thus, if no mechanisms to align the interests of managers to the ones of shareholders are 
present, such as executive compensation contracts or effectively monitoring of managerial 
actions, managers would have incentives to take low levels of risk. Therefore, a firm 
controlled or actively monitored by shareholders is expected to take more risk than a firm 
where managers’ individual interests prevail. By these same arguments, a shareholder that 
participates in the management of the firm would experience opposite risk incentives, 
suggesting that such shareholder would have an attitude to take less risk than a shareholder 
not involved in management. Another mechanism to solve the conflict of interests between 
shareholders and managers is the equity ownership by managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983). By such mechanism, interests of shareholders and managers 
converge as managers’ shareholdings increases, resulting in more risk taking. However, 
increasing levels of managers’ equity ownership may provide them with voting power 
sufficient to pursue personal objectives, resulting in less risk taking, expropriation of 
shareholders, and entrenchment. 
Incentives to risk taking are also influenced by ownership structure, investor protection 
laws and bank regulations. Conflicts of interests between managers and shareholders are 
argued to be more important in firms with dispersed ownership structures, as coordination 
problem hinders effectively monitoring of managerial actions by small shareholders, who 
have to rely on external monitoring through the market for corporate control (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1988). By contrast, conflicts between managers and shareholders are 
expected to be less important in firms with concentrated ownership structure, as controlling 
shareholders have strong incentives to monitor managers, and even replace them in the case 
of poor performance (Franks et al, 2001). Because shareholders’ interests are likely to prevail 
in firms in which the ownership concentration is high enough, we expect these firms take 
more risk than ones with a dispersed ownership structure. The considerations made by 
Burkart et al. (1997), however, point that as the monitoring effort exerted by a large 
shareholder increases, managerial initiative to pursue new investment opportunities decreases. 
In other words, too much monitoring reduces managers’ initiative to seek firm-specific 
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investments, which is detrimental to firm value. This can be translated in terms of less risk 
taking by managers at least when ownership concentration is not too high. These arguments 
lead to the first hypothesis to be tested in this study: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Bank risk taking is reduced at low to moderate levels of ownership 
concentration, when managers’ interests prevail and/or there is loss of managerial discretion, 
and increases with levels of ownership concentration above the threshold where 
shareholders’ interests prevail. 
 
In addition, investor protection laws and banking regulations can also play a role in 
shaping the risk taking attitude of banks. Some studies point that a legal system that protect 
small shareholders can substitute for the existence of a large shareholder that monitors 
management (Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002; John et al., 2000; Caprio et al., 2007). 
Therefore, the role of a large shareholder in increasing risk taking by managers is expected to 
be more important in countries without effective legal protection of shareholders. Finally, 
banking regulations aimed to avoid financial instability can affect banks’ risk taking 
behaviour. Despite the considerable empirical research on how ownership structure and other 
corporate governance factors affect financial institutions’ risk taking behaviour1, evidence on 
the relationship between ownership structure and bank risk in the presence of other country-
level governance mechanisms is scarce. Only the study of Laeven and Levine (2006) analyzes 
the relationship between bank risk taking and ownership structure, legal protection of 
investors and banking regulations across a large set of countries. Thus, our second hypothesis 
to be tested is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between ownership concentration and risk is reinforced if 
the country’s levels of shareholder legal protection, banking regulations promoting financial 
stability, or other country governance mechanisms are underdeveloped. 
 
The second element for evaluating bank’s efficiency is its performance. Then, it is also of 
interest to understand how banks’ performance is related with ownership structure, legal 
investor protection and bank regulations. Such issue, although linked to the previous risk 
                                                 
1
 Saunders et al. (1990); Anderson and Fraser (2000), Brewer and Saidenberg (1996), Chen et al. (1998), 
Demsetz et al. (1996) Demsetz and Strahan, 1997; Knopf and Teall, 1996; Cebenoyan et al. (1999), Gorton and 
Rosen (1995), Sullivan and Spong (1998, 2007). 
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taking discussion, deserves a separate investigation, as it may provide conclusions regarding 
bank corporate finance efficiency. There is little empirical evidence on the issue, contrasting 
with the extensive research available on the relationship between corporate performance and 
ownership structure of non financial firms (for a review, see Miguel et al., 2004). As 
previously argued, monitoring of managerial actions is difficult in a firm with dispersed 
ownership structure. On the contrary, a concentrated ownership structure providing effective 
monitoring in principle is expected to enhance firm performance. However, another potential 
conflict of interests arises in firms with concentrated ownership, as the controlling 
shareholders may engage in activities that expropriate minority shareholders (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1986; Faccio and Stolin, 2006). Therefore, concentration of ownership may also have 
a negative impact on corporate performance, due to expropriation of minority shareholders by 
controlling shareholders. Thus, these theoretical hypotheses of monitoring and expropriation 
have opposite predictions regarding the relationship between ownership concentration and 
performance. In their model for the role of large shareholders, Burkart et al. (1997) challenge 
the view that monitoring is purely beneficial, by describing a trade-off between the benefits of 
monitoring and the ones of managerial discretion. As previously stated, the excess of 
monitoring may be detrimental to firm value, as it reduces managers’ initiative to seek firm-
specific investments. . They propose the ownership structure as a commitment device to 
delegate a certain degree of control to management. The mentioned theories suggest that a 
non linear relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance is possible. In 
fact, Miguel et al (2004) predict and find empirical evidence of a quadratic relationship, in 
which performance (firm value) increases at low levels of ownership concentration (due to the 
monitoring effect), and decreases at high levels (as a result of the expropriation effect). 
However, relying also on the theoretical argument that expropriation in general is costly 
(Burkart et al., 1998), we should expect less severe expropriation in a high concentrated 
ownership structure. Therefore, a cubic relationship between ownership concentration and 
performance is possible. We propose the following  hypothesis to be tested: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Bank performance increases with ownership concentration at low levels of 
concentration due to effective monitoring by shareholders, decreases at intermediate levels of 
concentration due to expropriation of minority shareholders and/or less managerial 
discretion, and increases at high levels of concentration due to disincentives to internalize 
high costs of expropriation.  
 
 7
According to Miguel et al. (2004), there is no previous empirical evidence of the proposed 
hypothesis. Performance or firm value is also argued to increase in the presence of strong 
shareholder protection laws aimed to avoid expropriation by controlling owners (Claessens et 
al., 2000; La Porta et al., 2002). Therefore, the effectiveness of shareholder protection laws 
affects the relationship between ownership structure and performance. The unique 
characteristics of banks, however, may interfere in such relationship, as argued by Caprio et 
al. (2007). First, due to the higher opacity and complexity of banks (Morgan, 2002), investor 
protection laws alone may not provide effective protection to small shareholders. Second, 
heavy regulations imposed on banks may substitute for, or interfere with investor protection 
laws, or make these latter superfluous. As a consequence, it is not clear that we should expect 
a positive impact of investor protection laws on banks’ performance and valuation, as it is the 
case for non financial firms. In addition, given the uniqueness of banks, regulations 
themselves may interfere in the relationship between ownership concentration and 
performance, rendering banks different from non-financial firms. In principle, the focus of 
bank regulations is to attain financial stability, but the issue of whether bank efficiency is also 
improved as a consequence of bank regulations is important. Finally, we can expect that other 
country level mechanisms such as competition in the banking industry may interact with, 
complement or substitute ownership concentration in inducing banks’ managers to attain 
performance. In order to investigate the influence of banks’ peculiarities on performance, we 
propose  a last hypothesis to be tested: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The country’s levels of implementation of legal protection of shareholders, 
bank regulations and other governance mechanisms, strengthens the relationship between 
banks’ ownership structure and performance.  
 
With the purpose of providing a broader picture of how risk taking and expropriation 
incentives are shaping banks’ performance, this paper analyses how both risk and 
performance are affected by ownership concentration, investor protection laws and bank 
regulations. It has similarities with the studies of Laeven and Levine (2006) and Caprio et al. 
(2007), both in purposes and in the cross country coverage of the databases used. However, it 
differs from those in three aspects. First, our database comprises not only large and often 
publicly listed banks, but also medium, small and not listed commercial banks around 47 
countries out of the 49 ones for which La Porta et al. (1998) report data on legal protection of 
shareholders. As noticed by La Porta et al. (2002) and recognized by Caprio et al. (2007), 
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focusing on largest firms makes it harder to find a relationship between investor protection 
and firm value because large corporations have alternative governance mechanisms for 
limiting expropriation of minority shareholders, such as public scrutiny, reputation-building, 
foreign shareholdings, and listing on international exchanges. Second, our risk analysis relies 
on the volatility of earnings as the relevant measure of risk, instead of Z-Score as in Laeven 
and Levine (2006). Our belief is that Z-Score is rather a measure of stability, which may not 
convey a correct picture of bank risk taking behaviour. Last, the methodology used for both 
risk taking and performance analyses is based on panel data. More specifically, we perform 
dynamic panel data estimations through the Generalized Method of Moments. We believe that 
panel data analysis is able to control for omitted variables and endogeneity, an important issue 
when jointly analyzing ownership structure and performance (Coles et al., 2007). 
 
 
3. Data description 
A sample of banks around the world is drawn from the Bankscope database. The countries 
selected to conduct the cross country panel data studies are the ones for which La Porta et al. 
(1998) report data on legal protection of shareholders (except New Zealand, as most banks 
there are owned by Australian banks). Such selection of countries also allows comparability 
with the studies of Laeven and Levine (2006) and Caprio et al. (2007). Departing from an 
initial database of all commercial banks from the 48 selected countries, we collected available 
annual data on largest owner’s shareholdings and on accounting numbers for the period from 
1994 to 2007. To avoid duplicity of data, while keeping as many observations as possible, 
only unconsolidated statements were considered when collecting accounting data. To avoid 
redundant data, banks which the largest owner is another bank in the same country with at 
least 10% of shareholdings were excluded from the sample. Risk and performance variables 
were generated using standard deviations over a moving window of four years, which reduced 
the time dimension of the panel to the period from 1997 to 2007. Then, the sample was again 
reduced after generating other bank-specific variables and deleting multivariate outliers using 
the Hadi and Simonoff (1993) method. Finally, due to methodological issues (explained in 
Section 3.3), we excluded banks for which the ownership concentration variable has null 
variance and banks with less than 3 years of observations. We ended up with an unbalanced 
panel of 795 banks located in 47 different countries that correspond to 4,681 bank-year 
 9
observations distributed in the 1997-2007 period2. All regressions in this study were 
performed on such panel, or on sub-samples of it. 
 
3.1 Dependent  variables  
3.1.1. Risk 
Earnings Volatility: it is the risk measure from which the main results concerning bank 
risk taking are derived and it consists of the standard deviation of the ratio of total earnings 
before taxes and loan loss provisions to average total assets, computed over a moving window 
of 4 years. By using data from years 1994 to 2007, we were able to compute earnings 
volatility for the 11-year period from 1997 to 2007. Source: calculations on data from 
Bankscope. 
Z-Score: it is a ratio where the numerator is the sum of return on assets and the capital to 
asset ratio, while the denominator is the standard deviation of return on assets computed over 
a moving window of 4 years (e. g., see more of Z-Score in Boyd et al., 1993). Return on 
assets is the ratio of pre-tax profits to total assets. It is often referred as a measure of firm 
stability (or distance to default). Source: calculations on data from Bankscope. 
3.1.2. Performance 
Risk-Adjusted ROA: the bank’s ratio of return on average assets before taxes to the 
standard deviation of this same return. The standard deviation is computed over a moving 
window of 4 years. Source: calculations on data from Bankscope. 
 
3.2. Explanatory variables 
Explanatory variables used to explain bank risk and performance are grouped in two sets: 
bank specific and country specific variables. First set includes a measure of ownership 
concentration, given by the equity participation of the largest shareholder, and other controls 
at the bank level. Second set includes bank regulations and measures of legal and economic 
development of the countries where banks are established. Bank regulations variables are 
indices representing three broad regulations: capital requirements stringency, official 
supervisory power, and regulations promoting the private monitoring of banks. The rationale 
behind choosing these indices is to represent the concepts underlying the approach of three 
reinforcing pillars adopted by Basel II (Basel, 2001), although such indices do not measure 
adherence to Basel II. They were constructed following Barth et al. (2006) for three periods 
                                                 
2
 Canada ended up with no observations, mainly because banks there experience no volatility in largest 
shareholder’s equity participation. 
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(1997-2000, 2001-2003 and 2004-2007), using data from three surveys on bank regulation 
and supervision conducted by the World Bank (Barth et al., 2001, 2006, 2008). Additional 
country specific variables are the level of legal protection of shareholders, as well as the 
enforcement of law, and measures of the country’s financial and economic development. 
Finally, two proxies of competition in each country’s banking industry are included. A 
detailed description of each explanatory variable used in this study is provided in Appendix 1. 
As required by the regression techniques used in this study, year dummies are also included as 
explanatory variables in all regressions. 
 
3.3. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables in the selected panel (4,681 
observations, 795 banks). We notice that ownership concentration variable has a mean of 
58.72%, which is relatively high. Mean leverage is at 89.36%, a value that supports the view 
that banks are highly levered (Macey and O’Hara, 2003; John and Qian, 2003; Levine, 2003).  
Table 2 shows mean values of bank-level variables by country, whereas Table 3 shows 
means of country-specific variables. Given the diversity of countries included in the sample, 
Tables 1, 2 and 3 shows that heterogeneity observed on both dependent and explanatory 
variables across observations and countries is appropriate for conducting an econometric 
analysis. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
 
Table 4 contains the matrix of correlations between the variables. Regarding 
dependent variables, we first observe that risk variables of Earnings Volatility and Z-Score 
have a negative correlation of 9%. Although a negative correlation between these variables 
was expected, its value is not as high as one could expect, which highlights the difference in 
approaches of measuring bank risk through earnings volatility or distance to default (Z-
Score). It is remarkable the important negative correlations of Earnings Volatility with both 
Size and Leverage. It suggests that lower risk is associated with larger banks, which seems 
reasonableTable 4 also shows that higher levered banks are associated with lower risk, which 
in principle is unexpected. However, from a reverse causality perspective, it is reasonable that 
sound banks can afford more leveraged financial structure. On the other hand, leverage does 
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not appear significantly correlated with bank performance. Also remarkable are the important 
negative correlations of Earnings Volatility with Rule of Law, Financial Development and 
Log(GDP per capita), together with the positive correlations of these latter with performance 
measured by Risk-Adjusted ROA, suggesting that banks in more legally and economically 
developed countries experience lower risk and better performance. Concerning competition in 
the banking industry, negative correlations of Earnings Volatility, and positive correlations of 
Risk-Adjusted ROAwith both Bank Concentration and Log(Number of Banks)in principle are 
ambiguous. However, these proxies for competition reveal a very small and positive 
correlation of 3%, indicating that a regression analysis is necessary to clearly identify the 
relationship between these variables. Finally, Shareholders Rights correlates negatively with 
Earnings Volatility but has no correlation with performance. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
 
3.4. Methodology 
The methodology chosen to derive the results in this paper is based on panel data analysis. 
More specifically, we perform dynamic panel estimations using the so-called system 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), a combination of the estimation techniques 
proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond 
(1998).  
Our choice is first justified by the nature of the database available, which consists of 
observations of bank accounting and ownership variables distributed throughout a period of 
14 years (from 1994 to 2007). As described in the previous section, an unbalanced panel 
composed of 4,681 bank-year observations, comprising 795 banks, along 11 years (from 1997 
to 2007) was obtained after generating variables for bank risk and performance, and 
eliminating multivariate outliers.  
A key variable on the analyses performed is the Ownership Concentration, defined as the 
sum of the direct and indirect fractions of bank’s voting rights held by its largest shareholder. 
A concern would arise in using panel data techniques, if this variable were stable over time. 
However, for the panel used, there is variability in the Ownership Concentration variable for 
almost 80% of the banks. Yet we excluded from our sample the banks for which Ownership 
Concentration has no variability. 
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The main justification for the use of panel data analyses is that this technique is able to 
mitigate the influence of spurious characteristics in the relation between managers and 
shareholders. Similarly to Coles et al. (2006, 2007), we assume that risk, performance and 
ownership structure are jointly determined. It means that applying OLS techniques to our data 
would produce biased coefficients, provided that regressors are endogenous to the dependent 
variables. Following Roodman (2006), additional features of our data have driven our choice 
to system GMM, instead of traditional random or fixed effects panel data estimation. First, 
our dependent variables (risk and performance) are dynamic, in the sense that they depend on 
past realizations. This is intuitively true, as risk and performance are likely to experience time 
clustering. Also, our risk and performance measures depend on their past value by 
construction, as they consist or include a standard deviation calculated in a moving window of 
four periods. The problem is that, unlike GMM estimation, OLS or the so-called Within 
Groups estimator of a fixed effects panel estimation cannot eliminate the dynamic panel bias 
that arises when pre-determined variables are included as regressors. Second, other bank 
specific variables are suspected to be endogenous or not strictly exogenous, such as Leverage, 
Size and Revenue Growth. Third, the panel used has few time periods and a large number of 
observations. Fourth, our specification is overidentified, as there are more instruments than 
parameters, which generates a system of moment conditions with more equations than 
variables, a condition to use GMM estimation. Fifth, system GMM estimation allows for the 
inclusion of time-invariant regressors, without (asymptotically) affecting the coefficients 
estimates for other regressors. Such a feature is suitable for our database, as variables for bank 
regulations and investor protection laws experience low variation over time. Finally, 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within banks, but not across them, are assumed. 
All panel regressions performed in this study use system GMM, which means that a 
system of two equations is used for each model – the original equation and a transformed one. 
Pre-determined and not strictly exogenous transformed variables of the transformed equation 
are instrumented with their available lags in levels, whereas the variables in levels of the 
original equation are instrumented with suitable lags of their own first differences. The use of 
system GMM is argued to dramatically improve efficiency, respect to the so-called difference 
GMM, which consists only of the transformed equation. In this study, the transformation used 
in the second equation is the forward orthogonal deviations, which preserves the sample size 
of our unbalanced panel. We adopt the two-step estimation procedure with the finite-sample 
correction of standard errors proposed by Windmeijer (2005), which produces less biased 
coefficients and lower standard errors. To avoid problems of low precision of estimated 
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coefficients when the number of periods is small we excluded from our sample banks with 
less than 3 years of observations (Arellano and Bond, 1991). 
For all regressions, one lag of the dependent variable was included as a regressor (pre-
determined variable). The choice of the two different sets of instruments respective to their 
equations, adopted the following procedure. Lags of pre-determined variables and Ownership 
Concentration were always considered as instruments to the transformed equation (i.e., they 
are in the so-called GMM instruments set). In general, Revenue Growth, Leverage and Size, 
which are bank specific variables suspected to be not strictly exogenous, are also included as 
GMM instruments. The remaining variables are considered strictly exogenous and are 
instrumented by the so-called IV-styled instruments. This set of instruments includes the 
transformed and the level of each strictly exogenous variable. 
Regressions were run using the “xtabond2” program implemented by Roodman (2006). 
All regressions specifications are overidentified according to the Hansen test of 
overidentification restrictions (Hansen, 1982). Also, all the GMM and IV-styled instruments 
sets chosen are valid, as confirmed by the “difference in Hansen” test performed for each set 
of each regression (Hansen, 1982). Finally, the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation in the 
idiosyncratic disturbance term (aside from the fixed effect) is reported for each regression. 
 
 
4. Results 
This section presents and comments the results of our separate analyses of bank risk 
and performance and their relationships with ownership concentration, shareholders 
protections laws and banking regulations. 
 
4.1. Bank risk taking 
4.1.1. The role of ownership concentration 
In order to test Hypothesis 1, in Table 5 we examine the relationship between ownership 
concentration and risk controlling by legal, bank regulations, and other bank and country 
specific variables. Column 1 shows the results of running a regression of Earnings Volatility 
on Ownership Concentration which includes only some bank and country specific 
explanatory variables. The results found do not provide evidence of ownership concentration 
linearly affecting bank risk. As shown in regression R2, the inclusion of Leverage and State 
Owned variables does not change this result. Finally, regression R3, which includes also bank 
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regulations and shareholders rights variables, does not report a role for ownership 
concentration in explaining risk. Then, we expanded our model by including quadratic and 
cubic terms of Ownership Concentration to test for possible non-linear relationships with risk. 
Results in columns R4 and R5 of Table 5 support a quadratic relationship between ownership 
concentration and risk. Specifically, the relationship is U-shaped, with minimum Earnings 
Volatility occurring at the main owner’s participation of 25%, according to regression R5. 
Figure 1 shows the effect of Ownership Concentration on Earnings Volatility. The evidence 
favours the risk-shifting hypothesis, given that bank risk taking increases as Ownership 
Concentration grows from values of 25% and above, suggesting that largest shareholder 
experience increasing incentives to control or effectively monitor bank’s managers according 
to her interests. On the other hand, bank risk is lower for values of Ownership Concentration 
below 50%, which favours the argument that private interests of managers prevail when 
ownership is dispersed. Also, it supports Burkart et al., (1997)’s argument of less risk taking 
due to loss of managerial discretion under intense monitoring. We conclude that these results 
confirm Hypothesis 1. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
 
4.1.2. Sub-samples  
We proceed our analysis of bank risk by performing regressions on sub-samples of our 
working panel. First we check if ownership concentration differently affects bank risk taking 
across country legal protection of shareholders. The first two columns of Table 6 present the 
results of regressions considering respectively banks in countries with high shareholders 
rights (anti-self dealing index greater than its median of 0.41), and low shareholders rights 
(index equal or lower than 0.41). Results show that Ownership Concentration increases 
Earnings Volatility when protection of shareholders is high. Such evidence does not support 
Hypothesis 2, that rely on the theoretical argument that effective legal protection of 
shareholders works as a substitute for the existence of a large shareholder that monitors 
management. Instead, these mechanisms seem to complement each other to increase bank risk 
taking. In fact, shareholders are in a better position to monitor managers if they are legally 
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protected from self dealing on the part of managers. Interestingly, both capital regulations and 
official supervisory power are able to contain bank risk when shareholders’ legal protection is 
high.  
The next four regressions assess the importance of ownership concentration to bank risk 
taking when considering subsets of large/small banks and publicly listed/unlisted banks. This 
is to recognize that the importance of a large shareholder that monitors managers and 
encourages bank risk taking depends on the presence of additional governance mechanisms to 
which often only large and publicly listed firms are subject. Third and fourth columns of 
Table 6 contain the results of regressions on large and small banks subsets, respectively. Sub-
sample of large banks includes the ones which total assets are ranked below the median of the 
country total assets ranking distribution. Evidence for this subset is that ownership 
concentration does not help to explain bank risk, which conforms to Hypothesis 2, 
considering that probably other governance mechanisms work to shape risk taking behaviour 
of large banks. The sample of small banks is composed by banks which Size variable 
(logarithm of total assets) is lower than the median of this variable. Confirming Hypothesis 2, 
result in fourth column shows that ownership concentration helps to increase risk of small 
banks. Turning to the publicly listed/unlisted banks, the evidence points that ownership 
concentration is not important to explain risk in any of these sub-samples. This last result does 
not conform to Hypothesis 2. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
 
4.1.3. The role of laws 
Regressions in Table 5 do not report a role for shareholders rights in explaining bank risk. 
However, when analyzing sub-samples regressions of Table 6, we first find that increasing 
shareholders rights reduces the risk of small banks. Considering that in average ownership is 
more concentrated in the subset of small banks (mean largest shareholder’s stake of 67% 
versus 50% in large banks), this result may suggest that legal protection of shareholders is 
able to contain excessive risk taking by managers or controlling shareholders of small banks. 
Recall that for very high levels of ownership concentration the relationship between it and 
risk is increasing. However, this interpretation must be taken with caution, as the anti self-
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dealing index of Djankov et al. (2007) focus on publicly traded firms, while in our sample 
only 20% of small banks are listed.  
Concerning the degree of enforcement of laws, it is remarkable that Rule of Law reduces 
the risk of banks in the sub-samples of high legal protection of shareholders, large banks, as 
well as publicly listed banks, according to Table 6. The evidence supports a role for the 
effectiveness of legal systems in containing bank risk, that is complementary to shareholders 
protection laws and other governance mechanisms to which large and publicly listed banks 
are subjected.  
 
4.1.4. The role of bank regulations 
From regressions R3 to R5 in Table 5, we notice that capital regulatory restrictions reduce 
bank risk. Even though the Capital variable does not represent a perfect adherence to Basel 
II’s first pillar, we believe the evidence supports Basel II’s policy recommendation on the 
stringency of capital requirements to reduce bank risk taking and strengthen financial 
stability. Evidence from Table 6 tells that capital regulations stringency reduces the risk of 
banks in countries with high legal protection of shareholders, and of large banks. As 
previously mentioned, it suggests that capital regulations complement shareholders’ legal 
protection in reducing bank risk taking. In addition, it seems that capital regulations are more 
effective in reducing the risk of large banks. Regarding official supervisory power, there is 
evidence that it also behaves as a complement to shareholders protection laws in reducing 
bank risk. Regression R3 in Table 5 shows that the level of external private monitoring on 
banks has a positive effect on their Earnings Volatility. According to Table 6, this is 
especially true if shareholders’ protection laws are high and banks are small, even though the 
significance of coefficients is not high. The evidence suggests that regulations promoting 
transparency and market discipline of banks induce them to take more risk. Such result does 
not support the role of private monitoring as a reinforcing mechanism to capital regulations 
and official supervisory power in reducing risk. Despite the evidence is not desirable from the 
perspective of regulatory authorities, the effectiveness of private monitoring to induce not 
only bank risk, but also performance is assessed in Section 4.2.2. 
 
4.1.5. Z-Score analysis 
Regressions are also run on Z-Score as a dependent variable. For the complete sample, 
column R1 of Table 7 shows no evidence that ownership concentration influences Z-Score. 
We then decided to include Leverage as a regressor, as by construction, Z-Score is correlated 
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with Leverage. Doing so, ownership concentration still does not have any impact on Z-Score, 
as shown in column R2, even though Leverage appears negatively influencing Z-Score. After, 
we search for a similar evidence of Laeven and Levine (2006), who find a negative 
relationship between main owner’s cash flow rights (which is supposed to be highly 
correlated with ownership concentration) and Z-Score, in a sample composed by large banks. 
For such, we restricted the sample to the largest banks in each country (banks ranked bellow 
the median of country’s ranking of bank total assets). Confirming Laeven and Levine (2006), 
regression R3 of Table 6 shows a negative and significant coefficient for ownership 
concentration. However, including Leverage renders Ownership Concentration not significant 
(regression R4). Such finding may suggest that the results of Laeven and Levine (2006) 
should be interpreted taking into account that they do not consider leverage as an explanatory 
factor of bank stability through Z-Score. 
All regressions in Table 7 show a significant positive impact of Rule of Law on Z-Score. 
Together with the previously mentioned evidence of a decreasing impact of Rule of Law on 
Earnings Volatility, we conclude that, from a prudential point of view, Rule of Law has a 
beneficial role in terms of promoting bank soundness.  
 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
 
4.2. Bank Performance 
4.2.1. The role of ownership concentration 
In this section, we analyze the effect of ownership concentration on performance in order 
to contrast Hypotheses 3 and 4. Such analysis will also help us clarifying whether riskier 
taking decisions are always aimed at improving firm value. Instead, they may be the result of 
misbehaviour or inefficiencies resulting from the conflicts of interests between shareholders 
and managers, such as asset substitution, expropriation and entrenchment. In the case of 
banks, these problems might be worse due to higher opacity and leverage. Therefore, we 
extend our analysis by looking at how bank performance is affected by ownership 
concentration and other governance mechanisms.  
Table 8 shows the results of contrasting Hypothesis 3. The evidence found conforms to 
the previous hypothesis and supports a cubic relationship between ownership concentration 
and bank performance. Significance of linear, quadratic and cubic coefficients is attained at 
 18
least at the 5% level considering different sets of regressors. For the estimation including all 
regressors (column R4 of Table 8), the correspondent equation relating bank performance to 
ownership concentration support a positive effect of ownership concentration on performance, 
when the largest shareholder’s stake increases until around 30%. This effect occurs probably 
due to effective monitoring by the main shareholder (e. g., Burkart et al., 1997). For values of 
ownership concentration from around 30% to around 85%, bank performance decreases, 
supporting the hypotheses of expropriation of minority shareholders by the main shareholder 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Faccio and Stolin, 2004), or alternatively, of increasing costs of 
managerial loss of discretion (Burkart et al., 1997). From values of ownership concentration 
from 85% to 100%, bank performance increases, giving support to the prediction that 
expropriation is reduced as a consequence of its increasing costs imposed to the main 
shareholder (Burkart et al., 1998). Figure 2 illustrates the cubic shape obtained for the 
relationship between performance and ownership concentration.  
 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
 
4.2.2. Interactions  
It is argued in section 2 that the importance of agency problems is likely to differ 
contingent on firms’ ownership concentration structures. On the one hand, conflicts of 
interests between shareholders and managers are more important in dispersed ownership 
structures, respect to concentrated ownership structures. This is so because in the latter 
shareholders’ interests are likely to prevail. On the other hand, conflicts between controlling 
and minority shareholders are likely to be worse in firms with concentrated ownership 
structures. Therefore, in order to help deriving conclusions regarding the role of shareholders 
protection laws, bank regulations and competition on performance, we run regressions 
including the interaction of ownership concentration with variables for shareholders rights, 
bank regulations, and competition on two separate sub-samples of banks. The first sub-sample 
includes banks with dispersed ownership structures (main owner with an equity stake up to 
50%), while the second includes banks with concentrated ownership structures (main owner’s 
stake greater than 50%). 
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For the whole sample, we did not find evidence that the level of protection of shareholders 
influence bank performance (regression R4 of Table 8). However, there is evidence that 
shareholders rights and its interaction with ownership concentration matter for performance of 
banks with dispersed ownership structure. Coefficients for ownership concentration and 
shareholders rights enter positively and significant when explaining performance, whereas the 
coefficient for the interaction term is negative and significant (first regression of Table 9). 
These results tell, first, that an increase in ownership concentration improves performance of 
banks with dispersed ownership, supporting again the effectiveness of monitoring in aligning 
shareholders’ and managers’ interests. Second, increasing the protection of shareholders also 
improves performance. And third, the negative interaction term tells us that the positive effect 
of ownership concentration on performance is more important when shareholders rights are 
low.. Alternatively, increasing ownership concentration is less important to performance of 
banks in countries with strong legal protection of shareholders. Such evidence is very similar 
to the one of Caprio et al. (2007), except that they consider large banks with any ownership 
structure (not only dispersed ownership), and firm value instead of performance. The 
magnitude of the coefficients are such that at levels of ownership concentration below 26%, it 
is necessary a level of shareholders rights above its median to keep an increasing relationship 
between the net effect of these variables and performance. On the other hand, for levels of 
ownership concentration above 26%, the net effect of shareholders rights and ownership 
concentration on performance is increasing only if shareholders rights is below its median. 
This result suggests substitutive roles of ownership concentration and shareholders rights to 
increase bank performance, which does not support Hypothesis 4. We did not find any 
evidence for the role of shareholders rights in banks with concentrated ownership structures 
(regressions are not reported).  
 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 9 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
 
Regressions R3 and R4 in Table 8 report a role for some bank regulations in explaining 
bank performance. First, the stringency of capital regulations has a positive impact on Risk-
Adjusted ROA. Such evidence supports a beneficial role of capital regulations in attaining 
bank efficiency. Recall that we previously found that capital regulations stringency reduces 
bank risk (see Section 4.1.4). Considering that Basel II’s policy recommendations focus on 
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limiting bank risk taking to promote financial stability, our results go beyond and offer a 
strong argument to strengthen capital regulations: to improve bank efficiency, in addition to 
attain financial stability. In other words, capital regulations stringency is beneficial either 
from the systemic viewpoint of the regulator, as from the individual bank’s viewpoint of 
performance improving. Again, we clarify that capital regulations stringency in this study is 
represented by the index proposed by Barth et al. (2006), which does not represent a perfect 
adherence to Basel II’s first pillar. Table 9 provides additional evidence on the influence of 
capital regulations stringency on the performance of banks with dispersed ownership 
structures (largest shareholder’s stake lower than or equal to 50%). The interaction of Capital 
with Ownership Concentration is positive when influencing Risk-Adjusted ROA. It means that 
increasing both capital regulations stringency and ownership concentration helps to increase 
performance. For the selected sub-sample, ownership concentration linearly decreases 
performance, even though from Figure 2 we observe that there are ranges of increasing and 
decreasing performance with respect to ownership concentration. The positive interaction 
term tells that the decreasing effect of ownership concentration on performance is less 
important if capital regulations are more stringent. Irrespective of the relationship between 
ownership concentration and performance for levels of ownership concentration below 50%, 
we conclude that capital regulations and ownership concentration complement each other to 
increase the performance of banks y , which provides support to Hypothesis 4. 
Second evidence is the negative influence of Private Monitoring on bank performance, 
according to regressions R3 and R4 in Table 8. Together with the previous evidence of the 
positive influence of private monitoring on bank risk (see Section 4.1.4), we conclude for a 
detrimental role of private monitoring from the perspectives of both the regulatory authorities 
and the banks. It may be the case that the excess of transparency hinders competitive 
advantages of banks in seeking investments opportunities, in the sense that a certain level of 
information opaqueness is necessary for banks to provide added-value services (Bruni and 
Paterno, 1995). 
Finally, bank competition measured by the number of banks in a country has a positive 
impact on bank performance, according to regressions R2 and R4 in Table 8. Furthermore, 
last column of Table 9 shows that Log(Number of Banks) interacts positively with Ownership 
Concentration to increase the performance of banks with dispersed ownership structure. It 
means that the decreasing effect of ownership concentration in bank performance is less 
important if the bank industry is more competitive. Again, even though performance is 
initially increasing and then decreasing with respect to levels of ownership concentration 
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below 50% (see Figure 2), the complementary relation given by the positive interaction 
between competition and ownership concentration conforms to Hypothesis 4. 
 
4.2.3. Robustness check for cubic relationship  
The inclusion of quadratic and cubic terms of the Ownership Concentration variable in 
regressions of Table 8 may be a concern if collinearity between these variables is high enough 
to invalidate the cubic relationship obtained. Therefore, in order to check the robustness of the 
cubic relationship between ownership concentration and bank performance obtained in 
regression R4 of Table 8, we perform piece-wise regressions to assess the linear relationship 
between these variables in each of the three different ranges of ownership concentration 
characterized in Figure 2. In the first range, where Ownership Concentration is between 0 and 
30%, Risk-Adjusted ROA increases with Ownership Concentration. The second range has 
Ownership Concentration varying between 30% and 85% and is characterized by a negative 
relationship between Risk-Adjusted ROA and Ownership Concentration. In the third range, 
that includes values of Ownership Concentration from 85% to 100%, the linear relationship 
between the variables is positive. Table 10 report the results of the three separate piece-wise 
linear regressions for checking the sign of the linear relationship between Ownership 
Concentration and Risk-Adjusted ROA. The signs of the coefficients of Ownership 
Concentration for each range coincide with the signs of the net effect of this variable on bank 
performance, in each range of the cubic relationship represented in Figure 2. Moreover, the 
coefficients are significant for second and third ranges. Therefore, results in Table 10 assure 
the robustness of the cubic relationship between ownership concentration and bank 
performance previously obtained. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 10 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper examines the relationships between banks’ ownership concentration, risk and 
performance, controlling for legal protection of shareholders, bank regulations and other bank 
and country specific characteristics. We derive our results performing dynamic panel data 
estimations on a database composed of 4,681 bank-year observations, generated by 795 banks 
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located in 47 countries in the period from 1997 to 2007. Our analysis departs from studying 
the effect of ownership concentration (measured by the equity stake of the bank’s largest 
shareholder) on bank risk (measured by earnings volatility), and concludes that these 
variables have a non-linear U-shaped relationship. Bank risk increases at values of ownership 
concentration above 25%. This finding supports a role for ownership concentration as a 
mechanism of aligning the interests of managers to those of shareholders, who have intrinsic 
incentives to risk-shifting. Results also show that ownership concentration increases bank risk 
when legal protection of shareholders is high, suggesting that these mechanisms complement 
each other to increase bank risk taking, through effective monitoring of managers by 
shareholders if these are legally better protected from self dealing on the part of managers. In 
addition, evidence tells that the risk of small banks increases with ownership concentration. 
Contrasting with previous evidence of Laeven and Levine (2006), the result does not hold for 
large banks, which suggests that these are probably subjected to other governance 
mechanisms that shape their risk taking behaviour.  
Regarding the relationship between bank ownership structure and performance (measured 
by the risk-adjusted return on assets), we borrow from Morck et al. (1988) to propose a cubic 
relationship between both variables. We explain this S-shape relationship relying on the two 
main agency problems that appear within an organization, independently whether it is 
financial or non-financial. The first problem appears between managers and shareholders in 
the absence of appropriate incentives or sufficient monitoring to align manager’s interest with 
that of shareholders (we can define it as agency problem one, APO). The second agency 
problem appears between controlling and minority shareholders, when expropriation by 
controlling shareholders at the expense of minority shareholders takes place (we can define it 
as agency problem two, APT). The role of corporate governance mechanisms, like ownership 
structure, is to mitigate both agency costs (Shleiffer and Vishny, 1997). In particular, when 
ownership structure is dispersed, the APO is particularly harmful. In this situation, an increase 
in ownership concentration reduces the free-riding in monitoring that appears in dispersed 
ownership structures. As a consequence, APO is alleviated, and performance should improve. 
This logic applies until the point where the ownership concentration is high enough such that 
shareholders with a significant stake (blockholders) emerge. These blockholders have power 
high enough to force the firm to follow practices that only favour blockholders’ interests 
(APT). In this situation, the APT is more important than the APO and becomes particularly 
important as the ownership concentration increases. The result is a decrease in performance. 
Finally, when ownership concentration is quite large, the large stake of blockholders hinders 
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their incentives to internalize a very significant proportion of the expropriation costs. This 
should lead to an improvement in performance. An alternative explanation for a decrease in 
performance for moderate levels of ownership concentration is the trade-off between the 
benefits of monitoring and those of managerial discretion, proposed by Burkart et al. (1997). 
In other words, as monitoring by shareholders increases, managers have less discretion and 
initiative to seek new investment opportunities, which reflects in performance deterioration. 
The results confirm our arguments and we find evidence of a cubic relationship between 
ownership concentration and bank performance. Our findings indicate that the expropriation 
(and/or loss of managerial discretion) region is between 30% and 85%. This is remarkable 
given that for a significant proportion of banks (around 40%), the total stake of the three 
largest shareholders falls in that region. Such evidence gives us a warning signal of the 
seriousness of the problem in financial institutions, particularly in countries with a weak 
corporate governance system. This kind of situation introduces inefficiencies in the 
functioning of banks that may have perverse effect on the overall financial system. To 
investigate these issues in a deeper level should be the subject of some future research.  
Regarding the influence of country factors and its interactions with ownership 
concentration on bank performance, we first find that ownership concentration is more 
important to increase the performance of banks with dispersed ownership structures when the 
legal protection of minority shareholders is low, which is evidence similar to that obtained by 
Caprio et al. (2007). 
Second, the stringency of capital regulations has a positive impact on bank performance, 
which supports a beneficial role of capital regulations in attaining bank efficiency. Together 
with the evidence that capital regulations stringency reduces bank risk, the results offer a 
strong argument for strengthening capital regulations, provided that it is beneficial either from 
the systemic perspective of regulatory authorities, who seek to attain financial stability, as 
from the individual bank’s perspective of performance improving. Moreover, capital 
regulations stringency interacts positively with ownership concentration to increase 
performance of banks with dispersed ownership structure. 
Third, we report a negative influence of external private monitoring of banks on their 
performance. Together with the evidence of the positive influence of private monitoring on 
bank risk, we conclude for a detrimental role of private monitoring from the perspectives of 
both the regulatory authorities and the banks. It seems that the excess of transparency hinders 
banks’ competitive advantages that otherwise would derive from a certain level of 
information opaqueness. 
 24
Lastly, bank competition measured by the number of banks in a country has a positive 
impact on bank performance. In addition, competition interacts positively with ownership 
concentration to increase the performance of banks with dispersed ownership structure.  
A final comment is that our results help to shed a light on the issue of whether banks are 
different from non-financial firms. We obtained a non-linear (cubic) relationship between 
ownership concentration and bank performance that do not importantly diverge from the 
empirical evidence available for firms in general (see a survey by Miguel et al. 2004). 
Therefore, even presenting unique characteristics that make them differ from non-financial 
firms (e. g., higher leverage, greater opacity and heavy regulations), our evidence indicates 
that banks behave in the same way as firms in general, in response to the same agency 
problems and similar corporate governance mechanisms they are subjected, when compared 
with non-financial firms.  
1
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Appendix 1 – Description of Explanatory Variables  
 
Variable Description Source 
Bank specific   
Ownership Concentration The equity percentage participation of the largest shareholder of the bank. More specifically, it is the 
total participation of the largest shareholder taken from the Bankscope database, i.e., the sum of direct 
and indirect fractions of the bank’s voting rights held by the largest shareholder, whenever this 
information is available. Often, only the direct participation is available, and this value is used instead. 
Quadratic and cubic variables for ownership concentration are also generated for the examination of a 
cubic relationship between performance and ownership.  
 
Bankscope. 
Revenue Growth The bank’s average growth in total revenues respect to the previous year.  
 
Calculations on 
data from 
Bankscope. 
Size Natural logarithm of bank’s annual total assets in thousands of US dollars.  
 
Bankscope. 
Leverage The bank’s ratio of total debt to total assets.  
 
Bankscope. 
State Owned A dummy indicating if the largest shareholder of the bank is the government of a country or State. It is 
included to control for government ownership, which is argued to affect principal-agent relationships 
(Levine, 2003), and to be associated with poorly developed banks (Barth et al., 1999). 
 
Bankscope. 
Bank regulations   
Capital Stringency It is the Capital Requirements Stringency Index of Barth et al. (2006). It measures the level of 
stringency of capital restrictions imposed to banks, such as eligible funds for entering in the 
banking industry, and the use of risk based approaches by central banks when defining capital 
ratio requirements. Constructed for three periods (1997-2000, 2001-2003 and 2004-2007), using 
data from the surveys on bank regulation and supervision conducted by the World Bank. In our data, 
it ranges from 2 to its maximum possible value of 10, with higher values representing stricter 
capital regulations.  
 
Barth et al. (2001, 
2006, 2008). 
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Variable Description Source 
Official Supervisory Power It is the Official Supervisory Power Index of Barth et al. (2006). It represents the degree of the 
power that the supervisor authority has to oversee and intervene in banks functioning. Also 
constructed for three periods (1997-2000, 2001-2003 and 2004-2007), using data from the surveys on 
bank regulation and supervision conducted by the World Bank. In our data, the index ranges from 4 
to 14.  
 
Barth et al. (2001, 
2006, 2008). 
Private Monitoring It is the Private Monitoring Index of Barth et al. (2006). It gives a measure of the degree to which 
banks are exposed to external monitoring, apart from official regulatory and supervisory oversight. It 
comprises regulatory requirements of information and accounting disclosure, external auditing, 
depositor protection, use of subordinated debt, and discipline. The index was constructed for three 
periods (1997-2000, 2001-2003 and 2004-2007), using data from the surveys on bank regulation and 
supervision conducted by the World Bank. Higher values of the index represent more regulations 
promoting the private monitoring of banks. 
 
Barth et al. (2001, 
2006, 2008).  
Other country specific   
Shareholders Rights It is the measure of a country’s degree of legal protection of minority shareholders against 
expropriation by corporate insiders, represented by the anti-self-dealing index of Djankov et al. (2007). 
These authors argue that such index is better than their previous La Porta et al. (1998)’s anti-director 
rights index to explain a variety of stock market outcomes. It is assumed constant all over the period 
from 1997 to 2007. 
 
Djankov et al. 
(2008). 
Financial Development A proxy of a country’s financial development, constructed by Beck et al. (2000), using raw data from 
the IMF’s International Financial Statistics, October 2008. This variable is given by the total credit to 
the private sector by deposit money banks, as a share of GDP. It is available for each year of the 
period. Higher values of this variable should correspond to more developed financial systems. If it is 
originally missing, zero is assigned to this variable, and a separate indicator for missing value is 
included. 
 
Beck et al. (2000). 
Rule of Law It is a country governance indicator constructed by Kaufmann et al. (2008) measuring perceptions of 
the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the 
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of 
crime and violence. The authors rely on multiple sources to construct a weighted aggregate indicator. 
 
Kaufmann et al. 
(2008). 
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Variable Description Source 
Bank Concentration Total assets of country’s three largest banks as a share of assets of all commercial banks, constructed 
by Beck et al. (2000) using data from the Fitch’s Bankscope database. It reflects the level of 
concentration in the banking industry. 
 
Beck et al. (2000). 
Log (Number of Banks) It is the logarithm of the number of commercial banks in the country, made available by Barth et al. 
(2001, 2006, 2008), based on the surveys on bank regulation and supervision conducted by the World 
Bank. 
 
Barth et al. (2001, 
2006, 2008). 
Log (GDP) The logarithm of the annual country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), where GDP is given in billions 
of US Dollars. This variable is supposed to measure the size of a country’s economy. 
 
IMF, International 
Financial Statistics 
Log (GDP per capita) The logarithm of the annual country’s GDP per capita. This variable is relied as a measure of a 
country’s economic development. 
 
IMF, International 
Financial Statistics 
GDP growth The percent growth in a country’s GDP from the previous year to the current year. This variable 
reflects a country’s business cycle. 
 
IMF, International 
Financial Statistics 
Country-Average ROA Annual return on assets averaged across all banks in the country. Calculations on 
data from 
Bankscope. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
 
 
Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics  
(Panel with 4,681 observations of 795 banks around 47 countries, in the 1997-2007 period) 
 
Variable Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum Percentile 
10% 
Percentile 
25% 
Median Percentile 
75% 
Percentile 
90% 
Earnings Volatility (x102) 0.98 1.83 0.00 40.88 0.12 0.22 0.44 1.02 2.29 
Z-Score 38.99 118.83 -5.02 5583.42 3.88 9.21 20.40 41.40 75.55 
Risk-Adjusted ROA  3.16 3.83 -7.76 25.59 -0.13 0.56 2.40 4.47 7.60 
Own. Concentration (%) 58.72 35.56 0.01 100.00 5.01 27.30 57.76 99.21 100.00 
Revenue Growth 0.13 0.41 -2.01 2.46 -0.23 -0.06 0.09 0.27 0.56 
Total Assets (bn USD) 15.50 68.20 0.01 1680 0.13 0.35 1.35 6.87 29.00 
Leverage (%) 89.36 8.51 43.02 118.72 78.75 87.50 92.06 94.59 96.12 
State Owned 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Capital 6.42 1.67 2.00 10.00 5.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 9.00 
Official 10.80 2.35 4.00 14.00 8.00 8.00 11.00 13.00 14.00 
Private Monitoring 7.98 1.22 5.00 11.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 9.00 9.00 
Shareholders Rights 0.43 0.18 0.08 1.00 0.27 0.28 0.41 0.52 0.68 
Rule of Law 0.83 1.00 -1.67 2.04 -0.78 -0.04 1.30 1.68 1.86 
Log (GDP) 6.16 1.47 0.62 9.55 4.44 5.16 5.97 7.55 8.27 
Log (GDP per capita) 9.25 1.48 5.06 11.19 6.77 8.15 10.02 10.41 10.55 
GDP growth 3.06 3.04 -13.13 21.18 0.25 1.31 2.86 4.56 6.27 
Bank Concentration 0.59 0.19 0.21 1.00 0.35 0.42 0.59 0.71 0.86 
Number of Banks 542 1319 8 10,500 26 52 190 342 907 
Country-Average ROA 1.15 2.35 -26.76 23.39 -0.09 0.62 1.23 1.91 2.72 
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Table 2 – Country Descriptive Statistics (Mean of bank-specific variables) 
  
Country Obs Banks 
Earnings 
Volatility 
(102) 
Risk-
Adjusted 
ROA 
Z-
Score 
Own. 
Conc. 
(%) 
Revenue 
Growth 
Total 
Assets (bn 
USD) 
Lever 
(%). 
State 
Owned 
1 ARGENTINA 168 35 3.58 0.95 11.23 72.89 0.17 1.13 83.62 0.20 
2 AUSTRALIA 80 10 0.27 5.66 36.30 20.66 0.13 54.60 93.51 0.00 
3 AUSTRIA 141 21 0.75 5.24 47.40 65.37 0.20 2.70 89.83 0.00 
4 BELGIUM 88 13 0.54 3.10 24.79 92.03 0.16 10.80 92.76 0.00 
5 BRAZIL 256 48 2.57 2.14 14.25 75.26 0.14 6.95 85.30 0.16 
6 CHILE 64 10 0.33 6.17 40.90 66.67 0.13 5.52 90.87 0.00 
7 COLOMBIA 74 12 1.48 1.57 15.31 73.35 0.09 2.13 86.96 0.07 
8 DENMARK 141 23 0.34 4.81 36.42 34.23 0.11 11.90 89.28 0.00 
9 ECUADOR 38 6 2.05 2.57 18.20 55.48 0.19 0.51 88.51 0.00 
10 EGYPT 113 17 0.53 3.48 38.80 54.49 0.11 1.72 91.16 0.00 
11 FINLAND 12 2 0.41 5.38 31.06 15.48 0.08 1.60 94.13 0.00 
12 FRANCE 414 75 0.81 3.15 47.24 77.91 0.12 25.30 87.74 0.00 
13 GERMANY 548 75 0.54 2.93 89.68 70.40 0.09 30.70 91.23 0.07 
14 GREECE 63 10 0.83 2.17 18.34 44.69 0.22 14.50 92.02 0.00 
15 HONG KONG 20 3 0.50 5.02 46.70 69.53 0.02 4.89 82.93 0.00 
16 INDIA 175 32 0.58 3.31 17.10 61.45 0.19 7.35 94.80 0.42 
17 INDONESIA 195 34 2.06 3.42 23.97 61.96 0.18 1.33 86.22 0.02 
18 IRELAND 34 5 0.13 4.41 53.60 94.60 0.17 6.23 91.52 0.00 
19 ISRAEL 56 8 0.22 3.14 36.91 46.85 0.10 19.50 92.71 0.14 
20 ITALY 29 8 0.39 2.69 39.06 72.75 0.17 12.30 87.00 0.00 
21 JAPAN 391 77 0.34 1.36 29.42 7.11 0.01 33.90 95.29 0.00 
22 JORDAN 20 4 0.43 6.16 42.99 20.95 0.16 6.09 91.03 0.00 
23 KENYA 44 8 0.97 4.38 37.60 41.16 0.04 0.14 84.30 0.07 
24 SOUTH KOREA 62 12 1.00 1.48 12.16 38.51 0.24 44.80 94.64 0.15 
25 MALAYSIA 44 7 0.47 4.59 30.63 50.72 0.19 10.90 90.73 0.00 
26 MEXICO 6 2 2.17 2.26 14.88 100.00 0.37 15.30 78.31 0.00 
27 NETHERLANDS 22 5 0.24 4.68 49.78 77.59 0.28 1.95 91.56 0.00 
28 NIGERIA 81 15 1.21 3.49 15.01 51.68 0.20 0.59 88.06 0.00 
29 NORWAY 31 5 0.33 2.31 18.69 49.68 0.11 10.20 92.47 0.00 
30 PAKISTAN 97 17 0.74 3.80 20.53 58.28 0.20 1.29 93.35 0.12 
31 PERU 28 6 0.70 3.14 27.46 77.66 0.17 3.13 89.94 0.00 
32 PHILIPPINES 57 10 0.76 2.90 35.39 42.86 0.08 1.36 85.69 0.00 
33 PORTUGAL 70 11 0.50 3.12 42.35 68.18 0.16 13.20 91.48 0.07 
34 SINGAPORE 14 2 0.32 5.39 41.87 14.05 0.07 38.80 88.78 0.00 
35 SOUTH AFRICA 10 1 1.53 -0.25 6.83 88.45 0.04 0.08 91.33 0.00 
36 SPAIN 202 33 0.65 3.82 54.91 69.67 0.11 13.20 88.75 0.00 
37 SRI LANKA 33 5 0.65 4.11 25.30 18.29 0.16 0.67 91.72 0.09 
38 SWEDEN 23 4 0.54 2.38 12.70 33.51 0.03 76.20 95.68 0.17 
39 SWITZERLAND 342 51 1.09 4.72 54.42 77.12 0.14 11.80 79.87 0.04 
40 TAIWAN 104 19 0.34 2.09 31.31 23.94 0.10 12.00 92.84 0.05 
41 THAILAND 75 12 1.21 0.30 6.50 51.73 0.24 11.90 93.51 0.21 
42 TURKEY 37 8 2.92 1.53 7.42 56.40 0.34 10.40 84.65 0.00 
43 UNITED KINGDOM 21 4 0.36 2.71 32.10 55.46 0.07 0.24 86.07 0.00 
44 URUGUAY 39 7 2.96 0.65 9.92 85.23 0.16 0.45 92.37 0.08 
45 USA 81 16 0.37 5.94 43.49 66.85 0.18 12.40 89.95 0.00 
46 VENEZUELA 28 5 2.12 3.20 12.32 42.94 0.24 2.57 86.92 0.00 
47 ZIMBABWE 10 2 2.73 4.61 10.72 40.52 0.63 0.67 91.41 0.00 
  
Whole Sample 4,681 795 0.98 3.16 38.99 58.72 0.13 15.50 89.36 0.06 
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Table 3 – Country Descriptive Statistics (Mean of country-specific variables) 
 Country Capital Official 
Private 
Monit. 
Sh 
Rights 
Rule 
of 
Law 
Fin. 
Develop 
GDP 
per 
capita 
Bank 
Conc. 
(%) 
Number 
of 
Banks 
1 ARGENTINA 6.7 9.5 8.3 0.44 -0.49 8.31 5,340 41.6 80 
2 AUSTRALIA 6.4 11.2 9.7 0.79 1.76 9.70 24,989 77.5 52 
3 AUSTRIA 7.2 11.7 6.0 0.21 1.83 6.00 31,720 66.5 911 
4 BELGIUM 5.8 10.9 7.0 0.54 1.44 7.00 30,245 83.6 110 
5 BRAZIL 6.6 13.7 8.7 0.29 -0.34 8.68 4,074 44.3 180 
6 CHILE 5.8 10.8 7.4 0.63 1.17 7.39 5,822 52.4 27 
7 COLOMBIA 5.4 13.0 9.0 0.58 -0.80 9.00 2,571 38.7 27 
8 DENMARK 7.0 9.0 8.3 0.47 1.87 8.32 37,573 77.7 181 
9 ECUADOR 10.0 14.0 9.0 0.08 -0.73 9.00 2,028 60.1 23 
10 EGYPT 5.0 13.3 8.7 0.49 -0.06 8.70 1,402 57.0 41 
11 FINLAND 4.5 8.0 8.8 0.46 1.89 8.75 32,478 97.3 10 
12 FRANCE 6.0 7.4 6.5 0.38 1.34 6.50 29,237 55.7 365 
13 GERMANY 6.4 8.6 7.8 0.28 1.71 7.75 29,280 67.3 1,887 
14 GREECE 5.1 10.7 7.5 0.23 0.73 7.54 17,393 88.5 28 
15 HONGKONG 6.4 11.0 8.7 0.96 1.17 8.70 24,953 63.1 163 
16 INDIA 7.6 9.1 6.8 0.55 0.12 6.80 495 34.5 97 
17 INDONESIA 6.2 12.6 8.6 0.68 -0.86 8.60 1,091 54.6 145 
18 IRELAND 3.9 11.2 8.9 0.79 1.63 8.85 41,807 55.0 52 
19 ISRAEL 5.5 8.0 9.6 0.71 0.90 9.57 19,153 73.9 23 
20 ITALY 5.0 7.0 8.0 0.39 0.57 8.00 29,828 40.6 797 
21 JAPAN 6.1 12.0 9.0 0.48 1.35 9.00 33,739 37.6 234 
22 JORDAN 7.7 10.4 7.0 0.16 0.36 7.00 1,933 87.5 20 
23 KENYA 7.2 13.3 7.6 0.22 -1.02 7.61 463 56.9 46 
24 SOUTH KOREA  4.2 10.8 9.9 0.46 0.73 9.90 13,054 44.4 20 
25 MALAYSIA 4.2 11.8 9.0 0.95 0.47 9.00 4,645 42.7 29 
26 MEXICO 8.0 9.0 7.0 0.18 -0.47 7.00 5,530 61.1 52 
27 NETHERLANDS 5.3 6.5 8.6 0.21 1.75 8.64 34,717 70.5 447 
28 NIGERIA 7.9 12.0 7.4 0.52 -1.38 7.36 450 39.8 75 
29 NORWAY 6.9 8.7 7.3 0.44 1.93 7.29 46,621 91.9 15 
30 PAKISTAN 7.6 13.2 8.2 0.41 -0.82 8.21 572 56.4 38 
31 PERU 4.3 12.0 7.0 0.41 -0.66 7.00 2,716 73.8 13 
32 PHILIPPINES 5.8 11.4 8.1 0.24 -0.50 8.14 1,053 72.4 44 
33 PORTUGAL 7.0 13.7 6.9 0.49 1.16 6.89 14,071 79.8 59 
34 SINGAPORE 7.1 8.7 8.9 1.00 1.60 8.86 23,163 91.6 127 
35 SOUTHAFRICA 8.5 7.0 9.1 0.81 0.15 9.10 3,901 86.4 49 
36 SPAIN 9.6 9.6 8.3 0.37 1.26 8.29 19,316 74.1 287 
37 SRILANKA 6.3 8.2 8.3 0.41 0.02 8.30 1,017 66.8 24 
38 SWEDEN 3.0 6.4 6.7 0.34 1.82 6.65 32,585 95.5 25 
39 SWITZERLAND 6.4 13.7 7.6 0.27 1.98 7.64 43,711 85.8 369 
40 TAIWAN 5.5 11.0 8.2 0.56 0.85 8.23 13,830 27.7 39 
41 THAILAND 5.6 9.6 8.0 0.85 0.22 7.96 2,256 48.6 27 
42 TURKEY 5.8 13.7 7.8 0.43 0.01 7.78 5,870 71.5 53 
43 UNITED KINGDOM 6.6 9.9 9.8 0.93 1.73 9.76 31,769 58.4 386 
44 URUGUAY 6.0 12.4 9.0 0.17 0.50 9.00 5,817 50.8 19 
45 USA 6.7 13.0 9.3 0.65 1.60 9.31 37,503 24.5 8,740 
46 VENEZUELA 3.7 12.3 5.3 0.09 -1.05 5.25 4,701 41.5 19 
47 ZIMBABWE 5.3 13.8 9.0 0.44 -1.22 9.00 354 69.7 16 
 
WholeSample 6.2 10.7 8.1 0.48 0.58 8.11 16,103 62.5 350 
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Table 4 – Correlation Matrix 
(Panel with 4,681 observations of 795 banks located in 47 countries, for the 1997-2007 period) 
 
 Earn. 
Volat. 
Z-
Score 
Risk-
Adj. 
ROA 
Own. 
Conc. 
Reven. 
Growth 
Size Lever. Shar. 
Rights 
Capital Official Private 
Monit. 
Rule 
of 
Law 
Fin. 
Devel. 
GDP 
per 
capita 
Bank 
Conc. 
Log 
Number 
Banks 
GDP 
Growth 
Earnings Volatility 1                 
Z-Score 
-0.09* 1                
Risk-Adjusted ROA 
-0.22* 0.22* 1               
Own. Concentration 0.13* 0.03* -0.02 1              
Revenue Growth 0.03 -0.04* 0.04* 0.05* 1             
Size 
-0.24* -0.03 0.01 -0.31* 0.02 1            
Leverage 
-0.23* -0.03* -0.01 -0.2* 0.01 0.53* 1           
Shareholder Rights 
-0.07* -0.07* 0.00 -0.17* 0.01 0.23* 0.14* 1          
Capital 
-0.02 0.02 0.05* 0.07* -0.03 -0.11* -0.04* -0.13* 1         
Official 0.12* -0.07* 0.02 -0.07* 0.02 -0.03 -0.12* 0.00 0.07* 1        
Private Monitoring 0.03* -0.03 -0.08* -0.21* -0.03 0.18* 0.03* 0.31* 0.09* 0.25* 1       
Rule of Law 
-0.28* 0.13* 0.11* -0.01 -0.06* 0.16* 0.06* -0.16* -0.01 -0.31* -0.13* 1      
Financial Develop. 
-0.23* 0.11* 0.06* -0.01 -0.05* 0.12* -0.02 -0.13* 0.00 -0.09* -0.02 0.8* 1     
Log GDP per capita 
-0.19* 0.11* 0.05* 0.01 -0.05* 0.19* -0.01 -0.21* -0.06* -0.24* -0.01 0.89* 0.73* 1    
Bank Concentration 
-0.07* 0.08* 0.14* 0.16* 0.02 -0.15* -0.15* -0.28* 0.08* -0.08* -0.15* 0.42* 0.44* 0.34* 1   
Log Number Banks 
-0.09* 0.12* 0.08* 0.16* -0.05* -0.11* -0.07* -0.3* 0.11* -0.16* -0.24* 0.53* 0.45* 0.51* 0.03* 1  
GDP Growth 0.04* -0.04* 0.07* 0.01 0.14* 0.01 0.03* 0.18* 0.02 0.08* -0.02 -0.32* -0.35* -0.32* -0.1* -0.27* 1 
Country-Av. ROA 
-0.02 0.01 0.12* 0.09* 0.1* -0.04* -0.07* 0.02 -0.08* 0.11* -0.09* 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.11* 0.11* 0.26* 
* Significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 5 – Relationship between Bank Risk Taking, Ownership Structure, Laws, and Banking 
Regulations. 
Dependent variable: Earnings Volatility. GMM dynamic panel-data regressions+ over the period 1997-
2007. (Two-step system GMM, orthogonal deviations transform, Windmeijer’s std errors correction). 
Constant and year dummies omitted. All coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) are 
multiplied by 100. 
Independent variables (R1) (R2) (R3) (R4) (R5) 
 Bank Specific      
1 Earnings Volatility (t-1) 87.33 *** 
(15.77) 
87.67 *** 
(15.39) 
77.83 *** 
(18.00) 
64.33 *** 
(17.80) 
64.09 *** 
(16.94) 
2 Ownership 
Concentration 
0.00  
(0.00) 
0.00  
(0.00) 
0.00  
(0.00) 
-0.02 * 
(0.01) 
-0.06 ** 
(0.03) 
3 Ownership 
Concentration^2    
0.0002 * 
(0.0001) 
0.001 * 
(0.001) 
4 Ownership 
Concentration^3     
0.00  
(0.00) 
5 Revenue Growth 0.08  
(0.19) 
0.09  
(0.20) 
-0.02  
(0.09) 
-0.01 ** 
(0.00) 
-0.01 ** 
(0.00) 
6 Size -0.02  
(0.03) 
-0.02  
(0.03) 
-0.01  
(0.12) 
-0.03 * 
(0.02) 
-0.03  
(0.02) 
7 Leverage 
 
0.00  
(0.01) 
0.00  
(0.03) 
-0.01  
(0.01) 
-0.01  
(0.01) 
8 State Owned 
 
-0.05  
(0.10) 
-0.33  
(0.25) 
0.14  
(0.13) 
0.10  
(0.13) 
 Country Bank Regulations     
9 Capital 
  
-0.04 ** 
(0.02) 
-0.02 ** 
(0.01) 
-0.02 * 
(0.01) 
10 Official 
  
0.02  
(0.02) 
-0.01  
(0.02) 
-0.01  
(0.01) 
11 Private Monitoring 
  
0.04 * 
(0.03) 
0.02  
(0.02) 
0.03  
(0.02) 
 Other Country Specific     
12 Shareholders Rights 
  
-0.40  
(0.33) 
-0.17  
(0.19) 
-0.15  
(0.18) 
13 Rule of Law -0.09  
(0.16) 
-0.08  
(0.16) 
0.47  
(0.40) 
-0.18 * 
(0.10) 
-0.20 * 
(0.11) 
14 Financial Development 0.26  
(0.24) 
0.26  
(0.25) 
0.09  
(0.08) 
0.00  
(0.08) 
-0.01  
(0.08) 
15 Log (GDP) 0.19  
(0.19) 
0.18  
(0.20) 
0.14  
(0.10) 
-0.02  
(0.04) 
-0.03  
(0.03) 
16 Log (GDP per capita) 0.01  
(0.03) 
0.02  
(0.03) 
-0.52  
(0.33) 
-0.01  
(0.09) 
-0.01  
(0.09) 
17 GDP growth -0.06  
(0.06) 
-0.07  
(0.06) 
-0.04 *** 
(0.01) 
-0.02 * 
(0.01) 
-0.02 * 
(0.01) 
18 Bank Concentration -0.04 *** 
(0.01) 
-0.04 *** 
(0.01) 
0.26  
(0.22) 
0.15  
(0.28) 
0.28  
(0.24) 
19 Log (Number of Banks) 0.06  
(0.19) 
0.06  
(0.20) 
-0.04  
(0.07) 
0.02  
(0.04) 
0.03  
(0.04) 
20 Country-Average ROA 0.00  
(0.02) 
0.00  
(0.03) 
-0.03 *** 
(0.01) 
-0.04 *** 
(0.01) 
-0.04 *** 
(0.01) 
      
Number of obs. 4,323 4,323 4,323 4,323 4,323 
Number of groups (banks) 752 752 752 752 752 
Number of instruments 60 62 90 169 213 
GMM-style  instruments 1, L2(2), L.(5, 
14, 16) 
1, L2(2), L.(5, 
14, 16) 
1, L2(2), L.(5, 
6, 7, 16) 
1, L2(2, 3) 1, L2(2, 3, 4) 
IV-style instruments 6-8, 13, 15-
20, year dum. 
6-8, 13, 15-
20, year dum. 
8-15, 17-20, 
year dummies 
4-20, year 
dummies 
5-20, year 
dummies 
F (variables; groups - 1) 43.05*** 36.42*** 11.42*** 17.91*** 18.37*** 
Arell.-Bond test for AR(2) in 
1st differences (z; Pr > z) 
0.58 
0.561 
0.59 
0.555 
0.07 
0.947 
0.17 
0.865 
0.15 
0.878 
+ Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%; * 10% 
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Table 6 – Relationship between Bank Risk, Ownership Structure, Laws, and Bank Regulations  
(Sub-Samples) 
Dependent variable: Earnings Volatility. GMM dynamic panel-data regressions+ over the period 1997-
2007. (Two-step system GMM, orthogonal deviations transform, Windmeijer’s standard errors 
correction): Constant and year dummies omitted. All coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) 
are multiplied by 100. 
 Shareholder Rights Size Public listing 
Independent variables High Low Large Small Listed Unlisted 
 Bank Specific       
1 Earnings Volatility (t-1) 45.24 *** 
(14.17) 
73.01 *** 
(12.30) 
37.45 *** 
(9.00) 
73.55 *** 
(8.00) 
47.56 ** 
(19.43) 
88.65 *** 
(4.87) 
2 Ownership 
Concentration 
0.01 ** 
(0.00) 
0.01  
(0.01) 
0.01  
(0.01) 
0.02 ** 
(0.01) 
0.00  
(0.01) 
0.01  
(0.01) 
3 Revenue Growth 0.01  
(0.02) 
-0.10 * 
(0.06) 
0.00  
(0.02) 
0.00  
(0.07) 
-0.01  
(0.03) 
-0.04  
(0.03) 
4 Size -0.26  
(0.19) 
0.07  
(0.06) 
-0.16  
(0.13) 
0.01  
(0.14) 
-0.24  
(0.16) 
-0.03  
(0.03) 
5 Leverage 0.04 * 
(0.02) 
-0.01  
(0.01) 
0.02  
(0.02) 
-0.01  
(0.01) 
0.05  
(0.04) 
0.00  
(0.01) 
6 State Owned -0.12  
(0.18) 
0.07  
(0.21) 
0.11  
(0.25) 
0.09  
(0.16) 
0.37  
(0.27) 
0.09  
(0.26) 
       
 Country Bank Regulations      
7 Capital -0.05 * 
(0.03) 
-0.03  
(0.02) 
-0.05 ** 
(0.02) 
-0.03  
(0.02) 
0.00  
(0.02) 
-0.03  
(0.03) 
8 Official -0.05 * 
(0.03) 
0.01  
(0.01) 
0.00  
(0.02) 
-0.04  
(0.02) 
-0.01  
(0.03) 
0.02  
(0.02) 
9 Private Monitoring 0.09 * 
(0.05) 
-0.02  
(0.03) 
0.03  
(0.04) 
0.08 ** 
(0.03) 
-0.05  
(0.04) 
0.03  
(0.04) 
       
 Other Country Specific      
10 Shareholders Rights -0.67  
(0.45) 
-0.66  
(0.52) 
-0.11  
(0.24) 
-0.46 * 
(0.26) 
0.34  
(0.32) 
-0.27  
(0.38) 
11 Rule of Law -0.48 ** 
(0.19) 
-0.09  
(0.12) 
-0.35 *** 
(0.10) 
-0.19  
(0.13) 
-0.50 ** 
(0.22) 
0.12  
(0.16) 
12 Financial Development 0.18  
(0.18) 
0.11  
(0.30) 
-0.01  
(0.10) 
0.19  
(0.17) 
-0.06  
(0.13) 
0.40  
(0.42) 
13 Log (GDP) 0.13  
(0.18) 
0.09  
(0.06) 
0.09  
(0.13) 
-0.04  
(0.05) 
0.04  
(0.10) 
0.11  
(0.13) 
14 Log (GDP per capita) 0.13  
(0.10) 
-0.12  
(0.14) 
0.15 * 
(0.08) 
-0.07  
(0.07) 
0.30 * 
(0.17) 
-0.28  
(0.22) 
15 GDP growth 0.00  
(0.02) 
-0.04 ** 
(0.02) 
-0.02 *** 
(0.01) 
-0.06 *** 
(0.02) 
-0.03 ** 
(0.01) 
-0.02  
(0.02) 
16 Bank Concentration 0.42  
(0.42) 
0.19  
(0.33) 
0.01  
(0.22) 
-0.11  
(0.36) 
0.12  
(0.31) 
-0.31  
(0.44) 
17 Log (Number of Banks) -0.05  
(0.18) 
-0.06  
(0.05) 
-0.02  
(0.05) 
0.03  
(0.05) 
0.00  
(0.09) 
-0.04  
(0.08) 
18 Country-Average ROA -0.15 *** 
(0.04) 
-0.01  
(0.02) 
-0.03 ** 
(0.02) 
-0.03 ** 
(0.02) 
0.01  
(0.01) 
-0.09 ** 
(0.04) 
       
Number of obs. 2,139 2,184 2,192 2,118 1,679 2,644 
Number of groups (banks) 377 375 366 431 324 497 
Number of instruments 359 358 359 359 321 125 
GMM-style  instruments 1, L2(2), 
L.(3, 4, 5) 
1, L2(2), 
L.(3, 4, 5) 
1, L2(2), 
L.(3, 4, 5) 
1, L2(2), 
L.(3, 4, 5) 
1, L2(2), 
L.(3, 4, 5) 
1, L2(2) 
IV-style instruments 6-18, time 
dummies 
6-18, time 
dummies 
6-18, time 
dummies 
6-18, time 
dummies 
6-18, time 
dummies 
3-18, time 
dummies 
F (variables; groups - 1) 14.75*** 43.34*** 11.75*** 50.72*** 12.77*** 29.21*** 
Arell.-Bond test for AR(2) in 
1st differences (z; Pr > z) 
-0.24 
0.813 
0.93 
0.354 
0.16 
0.870 
0.85 
0.398 
-0.91 
0.362 
0.75 
0.456 
    + Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% 
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Table 7 – Relationship between Z-Score, Own. Concentration, Laws, and Regulations. 
Dependent variable: Z-Score. GMM dynamic panel-data regressions+ over the period 1997-2007. 
(Two-step system GMM, orthogonal deviations transform, Windmeijer’s standard errors correction): 
(R1): All the sample; (R2): All the sample, including Leverage; (R3): Large Banks; (R4) Large Banks, 
including Leverage. Constant and year dummies omitted.  
 
Independent variables (R1) (R2) (R3) (R4) 
 Bank Specific     
1 Z-Score (t-1) 0.29 ** 
(0.13) 
0.29 ** 
(0.13) 
0.55 *** 
(0.04) 
0.57 *** 
(0.06) 
2 Ownership Concentration 0.02  
(0.25) 
0.03  
(0.25) 
-0.13 * 
(0.08) 
-0.08  
(0.07) 
3 Revenue Growth -2.80  
(7.21) 
-2.05  
(7.10) 
0.30  
(0.47) 
-0.41  
(0.80) 
4 Size -0.63  
(1.36) 
0.53  
(1.34) 
-1.10 ** 
(0.49) 
-0.42  
(0.67) 
5 Leverage 
 
-0.49 *** 
(0.15)  
-0.29  
(0.27) 
6 State Owned 4.21  
(7.72) 
3.21  
(7.68)   
      
 Country Bank Regulations     
7 Capital 0.11  
(0.59) 
0.14  
(0.59) 
0.45  
(0.31) 
0.40  
(0.31) 
8 Official -0.55  
(0.57) 
-0.67  
(0.59) 
-0.24  
(0.35) 
-0.29  
(0.38) 
9 Private Monitoring 0.62  
(1.08) 
0.58  
(1.08) 
-0.45  
(0.68) 
-0.17  
(0.85) 
      
 Other Country Specific     
10 Shareholders Rights -2.73  
(5.84) 
-3.32  
(5.83) 
-2.19  
(3.99) 
-4.81  
(4.11) 
11 Rule of Law 6.70 ** 
(2.83) 
8.06 *** 
(2.89) 
4.90 *** 
(1.44) 
5.91 *** 
(1.56) 
12 Financial Development 1.06  
(4.75) 
0.83  
(4.84)   
13 Log (GDP) -0.71  
(1.91) 
-0.65  
(1.92)   
14 Log (GDP per capita) -1.12  
(2.19) 
-2.27  
(2.22) 
-1.01  
(0.92) 
-1.40  
(1.05) 
15 GDP growth -0.08  
(0.44) 
-0.11  
(0.43)   
16 Bank Concentration 6.81  
(7.84) 
5.45  
(7.73)   
17 Log (Number of Banks) 2.14  
(1.73) 
2.13  
(1.72)   
18 Country-Average ROA 0.21  
(0.51) 
0.08  
(0.51) 
0.22  
(0.16) 
0.27  
(0.22) 
     
Number of obs. 4,681 4,681 2,314 2,314 
Number of groups (banks) 795 795 382 382 
Number of instruments 56 57 180 262 
GMM-style  instruments 1, L2(2),  
L(3, 4) 
1, L2(2),  
L(3, 4) 
L(1, 3),  
L2(2) 
L(1, 3, 5),  
L2(2) 
IV-style instruments 6-18, year 
dummies 
5-18, year 
dummies 
4, 7-11, 14, 
18, year dum. 
4, 7-11, 14, 
18, year dum. 
F (variables; groups - 1) 6.32*** 6.83*** 25.67*** 23.85*** 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in 1st 
differences (z; Pr > z) 
0.51 
0.613 
0.50 
0.615 
1.65 
0.101 
1.64 
0.102 
+ Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%; * 10% 
 39
Table 8 – Cubic Relationship between Bank Performance and Ownership Concentration, 
controlled for Laws, Banking Regulations, and Bank specific factors 
Dependent variable: Risk-Adjusted ROA (Return over Average Assets). GMM dynamic panel-data 
regressions+ over the period 1997-2007 (Two-step system GMM, orthogonal deviations transform, 
Windmeijer’s standard errors correction). Constant and year dummies omitted. All coefficients and 
standard errors (in parentheses) are multiplied by 100. 
 
Independent variables (R1) (R2) (R3) (R4) 
 Bank Specific     
1 Risk-Adjusted ROA (t-1) 33.73 *** 
(9.51) 
31.40 *** 
(8.81) 
33.87 *** 
(9.23) 
31.40 *** 
(8.95) 
2 Own. Concentration 38.87 *** 
(11.47) 
35.64 ** 
(16.67) 
39.60 *** 
(13.80) 
36.92 ** 
(17.30) 
3 Own. Concentration ^2 -0.87 *** 
(0.27) 
-0.83 ** 
(0.38) 
-0.90 *** 
(0.33) 
-0.84 ** 
(0.39) 
4 Own. Concentration ^3 0.005 *** 
(0.002) 
0.005 ** 
(0.002) 
0.005 *** 
(0.002) 
0.005 ** 
(0.002) 
5 Revenue Growth 0.94 *** 
(0.33) 
0.15  
(5.39) 
2.93  
(4.36) 
-0.02  
(5.40) 
6 Size 43.30  
(29.16) 
58.06 * 
(30.41) 
52.79 * 
(30.66) 
56.17 * 
(31.02) 
7 Leverage -7.10  
(5.02) 
-8.07 ** 
(3.74) 
-7.40  
(4.70) 
-8.13 ** 
(3.62) 
8 State Owned -41.60  
(45.89) 
-63.86  
(44.91) 
-66.05  
(45.95) 
-66.51  
(47.44) 
 Country Bank Regulations     
9 Capital   14.66 *** 
(4.72) 
10.32 ** 
(4.12) 
10 Official   2.31  
(3.77) 
4.39  
(5.06) 
11 Private Monitoring   -32.59 *** 
(12.58) 
-17.01 ** 
(8.22) 
 Other Country Specific     
12 Shareholders Rights    56.04  
(67.13) 
13 Rule of Law  94.56 *** 
(25.18)  
88.69 *** 
(25.60) 
14 Financial Development  -94.92 *** 
(32.46)  
-91.43 *** 
(31.25) 
15 Log (GDP)  -63.18 *** 
(20.06)  
-53.90 *** 
(20.83) 
16 Log (GDP per capita)  -24.04  
(18.43)  
-14.82  
(17.46) 
17 GDP growth  2.06  
(2.67)  
1.80  
(2.63) 
18 Bank Concentration  -29.00  
(76.69)  
-48.74  
(75.19) 
19 Log (Number of Banks)  60.41 ** 
(24.51)  
50.16 ** 
(23.45) 
20 Country-Average ROA  6.42 * 
(3.35)  
6.30 * 
(3.30) 
     
Number of obs. 4,681 
Number of groups (banks) 795 
Number of instruments 363 443 438 447 
GMM-style  instruments 1, L2(2, 3, 4), 
L(6, 7) 
1, L2(2, 3, 4), 
L(5, 6, 7) 
1, L2(2, 3, 4), 
L(5, 6, 7) 
1, L2(2, 3, 4), 
L(5, 6, 7) 
IV-style instruments 5, year 
dummies 
8, 13-20, year 
dummies 
8-11, year 
dummies 
8-20, year 
dummies 
F (variables; groups - 1) 14.96 *** 14.85 *** 14.82 *** 13.07 *** 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in 
1st differences (z; Pr > z) 
0.97 
0.332 
0.97 
0.333 
0.95 
0.343 
0.97 
0.332 
+ Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%; * 10%. 
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 Table 9 – Banks with Dispersed Ownership Structures: The Effect of Shareholders Protection 
Laws, Capital Regulations and Competition on Bank Performance  
Dependent variable: Risk-Adjusted ROA (Return over Average Assets). GMM dynamic panel-data 
regressions+ over the period 1997-2007. (Two-step system GMM, orthogonal deviations transform, 
Windmeijer’s standard errors correction). Constant and year dummies omitted. All coefficients and 
standard errors (in parentheses) are multiplied by 100. 
Independent variables Shareholders Rights Capital Log (Number Banks) 
1 Risk-Adjusted ROA (t-1) 47.85 *** 
(4.26) 
50.55 *** 
(4.03) 
48.50 *** 
(4.45) 
 Interaction    
2 Ownership Concentration 19.05 ** 
(7.77) 
-8.72 *** 
(3.22) 
-6.61 * 
(4.05) 
3 Shareholders Rights 1,033 ** 
(437.16) 
97.88 
(67.81) 
-19.14 
(94.18) 
4 Capital 1.99 
(5.50) 
-25.87 * 
(14.95) 
6.85 
(5.54) 
5 Log (Number of Banks) 52.33 * 
(28.89) 
59.28 *** 
(17.51) 
37.27 
(37.96) 
6 Own. Concentration * 
Shareholders Rights 
-39.39 ** 
(16.68)   
7 Own. Concentration * 
Capital  
1.26 *** 
(0.47)  
8 Own. Concentration * Log 
(Number of Banks)   
1.46 * 
(0.79) 
 Other Bank and Country Specific  
4     
9 Revenue Growth -19.44 
(41.08) 
29.73 
(22.47) 
-11.53 
(40.41) 
10 Size 35.90 
(33.92) 
19.70 
(19.25) 
59.00 * 
(35.39) 
11 Leverage -0.16 
(4.31) 
3.22 
(3.36) 
-0.61 
(5.32) 
12 State Owned -71.85 
(86.88) 
29.09 
(70.14) 
-74.76 
(90.70) 
13 Official -4.47 
(6.09) 
3.20 
(5.09) 
-2.73 
(6.36) 
14 Private Monitoring -10.24 
(11.47) 
-9.28 
(9.06) 
6.24 
(10.66) 
15 Rule of Law -13.22 
(44.16) 
20.81 
(33.51) 
9.13 
(40.14) 
16 Financial Development -57.73 
(39.57) 
-82.33 *** 
(29.18) 
-108.05 *** 
(40.69) 
17 Log (GDP) -80.12 *** 
(27.06) 
-61.50 *** 
(18.99) 
-95.47 *** 
(28.02) 
18 Log (GDP per capita) 32.74 
(22.89) 
16.67 
(22.46) 
25.10 
(21.77) 
19 GDP growth 3.55 
(2.41) 
2.90 
(2.10) 
2.83 
(2.49) 
20 Bank Concentration -83.12 
(82.59) 
94.40 
(75.47) 
-86.54 
(89.58) 
21 Country-Average ROA 15.12 *** 
(4.48) 
8.58 ** 
(3.62) 
8.46 * 
(4.40) 
Number of obs. 1,844 1,844 1,844 
Number of groups (banks) 353 353 353 
Number of instruments 81 340 82 
GMM-style instruments L2.(1), 4 
L(5, 6, 7) 
L2(1), 9, L(10, 
11, 12) 
L2(1), 9, L(10, 11, 12) 
IV-style instruments 2, 3, 8-19, year 
dummies 
2, 4-8, 12-20, 
year dummies 
2, 4-8, 12-20, year 
dummies 
F (variables; groups - 1) 14.74*** 19.64*** 14.19*** 
Arell.-Bond test for AR(2) in  
1st differences (z; Pr > z) 
1.28 
0.201 
1.27 
0.203 
1.26 
0.209 
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+ Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%; * 10%. 
Table 10 – Robustness Check for Cubic Relationship between Bank Performance and 
Ownership Concentration. 
Dependent variable: Risk-Adjusted ROA (Return over Average Assets). GMM dynamic panel-data 
regressions+ over the period 1997-2007 (Two-step system GMM, orthogonal deviations transform, 
Windmeijer’s standard errors correction). Constant and year dummies omitted. All coefficients and 
standard errors (in parentheses) are multiplied by 100. 
 
Independent variables Own. Conc <=30 30<Own. Conc <85  Own. Conc >=85 
 Bank Specific    
1 Risk-Adjusted ROA (t-1) 48.73 *** 
(4.75) 
22.96 ** 
(9.95) 
34.58 *** 
(6.45) 
2 Own. Concentration 0.05  
(1.15) 
-3.62 ** 
(1.84) 
2.78 * 
(1.91) 
3 Revenue Growth -13.16  
(74.45) 
7.57 * 
(4.15) 
9.53  
(11.46) 
4 Size 7.12  
(8.10) 
56.54  
(45.07) 
23.43 *** 
(7.23) 
5 Leverage -2.45  
(2.06) 
-6.52  
(7.24) 
-2.12 ** 
(1.05) 
6 State Owned 48.73 *** 
(4.75) 
-86.92  
(89.72) 
-8.15  
(30.72) 
 Country Bank Regulations    
7 Capital 148.88  
(132.66) 
4.46  
(7.01) 
7.20  
(5.52) 
8 Official 14.55 ** 
(7.02) 
-4.41  
(11.10) 
11.36 ** 
(5.01) 
9 Private Monitoring 3.72  
(6.20) 
-15.68  
(13.41) 
-3.44  
(10.55) 
 Other Country Specific    
10 Shareholders Rights 73.43  
(78.77) 
-39.30  
(125.21) 
107.69  
(78.06) 
11 Rule of Law 40.78  
(46.65) 
100.33 * 
(52.44) 
75.00 ** 
(31.24) 
12 Financial Development -75.96 *** 
(28.27) 
-61.20  
(72.44) 
-10.76  
(50.94) 
13 Log (GDP) -31.71  
(23.18) 
-84.24 ** 
(33.67) 
-19.25  
(18.54) 
14 Log (GDP per capita) 11.54  
(29.87) 
-37.29  
(35.87) 
-13.22  
(18.31) 
15 GDP growth 4.54  
(4.05) 
1.03  
(4.13) 
3.57  
(3.62) 
16 Bank Concentration -1.38  
(130.24) 
18.62  
(86.55) 
-121.19  
(80.05) 
17 Log (Number of Banks) 16.16  
(15.83) 
80.47 ** 
(37.58) 
14.46  
(14.63) 
18 Country-Average ROA 21.35 ** 
(9.94) 
1.67  
(4.47) 
6.43  
(4.20) 
    
Number of obs. 1,167 1,540 1,553 
Number of groups (banks) 231 305 301 
Number of instruments 156 287 197 
GMM-style  instruments 1, L2(2), L(3) 1, L2(2), L(4, 5) 1, L2(2), L(3) 
IV-style instruments 4-18,  
year dummies 
3, 6-18,  
year dummies 
4-18,  
year dummies 
F (variables; groups - 1) 25.65*** 7.13*** 8.72*** 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in 
1st differences (z; Pr > z) 
0.99 
0.323 
0.68 
0.497 
1.12 
0.261 
+ Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%; * 10%. 
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Figure 1 – U-Shaped Relationship between Bank Risk and Ownership Concentration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Cubic Relationship between Bank Performance and Ownership 
Concentration  
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